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Introduction
Inclusionary zoning is currently one of the most promising policies in the field of
affordable housing, and one which has been slowly gaining in popularity since the 1970’s.
Inclusionary zoning works by requiring housing developers to include a certain percentage of
affordable housing in their developments. A municipality will write an inclusionary zoning
ordinance into its zoning code to specify exactly how much affordable housing developers
should create, what income levels it should be available to, how long it should remain affordable,
and what kind of compensation developers are given in exchange. The basic idea is to leverage
private housing markets to provide for the needs of low- and moderate-income households who
either can’t afford to live near where they work or who find themselves being forced out of their
homes by soaring housing prices. Inclusionary zoning responds to these needs by ensuring
affordable housing units are inconspicuously integrated into market-rate developments. This
helps to achieve the dual goals of creating affordable housing and reducing economic
segregation in the housing market.
Inclusionary zoning came into being as a way to combat the implicitly “exclusionary” zoning
codes of many affluent, suburban towns which served to discourage the migration of low-income
people away from urban areas. After gradually becoming more popular over the past few
decades, it is now found in hundreds of municipalities nationwide. As inclusionary zoning
becomes an increasingly popular tool of policymakers, it is essential that past and current
experiences with it be examined critically, so as to employ future programs to their full potential.
This paper seeks to analyze the basics of inclusionary zoning and find ways in which it can
most effectively be applied to a greater number of cities and towns. Towards this goal, I first
give a brief history of inclusionary zoning and describe some of the most well-known examples
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of its implementation. I then examine the need for affordable and inclusionary housing, what
other policies are currently being used to meet this need, and how inclusionary zoning fits in.
Following this, I detail what exactly an inclusionary zoning ordinance entails and look at the
legal and economic issues relating to inclusionary zoning. Subsequently, I propose explanations
for some of the successes and failures that have been encountered in implementing inclusionary
zoning. I then discuss what special considerations might have to be made in adapting
inclusionary zoning to different geographical areas. Finally, I review policy recommendations
made in the literature, and propose a few recommendations of my own.
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Inclusionary Zoning
Inclusionary zoning is one of the most promising policies to increase affordable housing.
The term “inclusionary zoning” refers to any zoning regulations that either mandate or provide
incentives for housing developers to include a certain percentage of housing units in their
developments that are priced below market-rates. Inclusionary zoning which is incentive-based
rather than mandatory is also called “incentivized zoning”, and both terms fall under the category
of “inclusionary housing”, which is the general practice of integrating affordable housing into the
rest of the general housing stock by any means. (“Inclusionary zoning” and “inclusionary
housing” can sometimes be used interchangeably, and I may refer to both as IZ and IH,
respectively.) The term “inclusionary zoning” was coined to contrast with “exclusionary
zoning”, which is zoning which explicitly or implicitly leads to segregated housing. Housing
segregation is manifested in a variety of ways and is now more frequently economic than racial,
although much of the economic housing segregation today stems from racial segregation.
“Exclusionary zoning” refers to zoning code which perpetuates this segregation by effectively
prohibiting low- and moderate-income households from living in areas with predominantly highincome housing. For example, a town’s zoning code may prohibit multifamily housing, or
require that houses or housing lots be of a certain minimum size, or that parcels of land have no
more than a certain housing density. Zoning code to this effect can essentially bar modest
housing or apartments from being built within a town’s limits. Even if the prohibition on low or
modest-income housing is unintentional on the part of a municipality’s planners or legislature,
what may often be borne in mind is an implicit desire to preserve an exclusionary status quo, and
this can be just as insidious. Advocates for mixed and affordable housing have made inroads
against exclusionary zoning by making the argument that it is inherently unjust when police
officers, fire fighters, or other public workers with modest salaries can’t afford to live in the very
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towns in which they serve. Another argument against exclusionary zoning is that it leads to the
concentration of low- and modest-income people within cities, separating the tax base needed to
support public services from the people that need them. This economic segregation also increases
commute times if people cannot afford to live near where they work, contributing to urban
sprawl. Economically segregated housing may also be seen as an ethical problem, wherein
vestigial de facto racial segregation is perpetuated and a person’s quality of life is determined by
place of birth. It is against this background that inclusionary zoning came about.
Inclusionary zoning exists in a number of forms, owing to its multipart beginnings. One of
the earliest precursors to modern inclusionary zoning was the passage in 1969 of Chapter 40B of
the General Laws of Massachusetts, known as the “antisnob” law or simply Chapter 40B. This
law to a large degree strips control over housing development away from local governments and
places it in developers’ hands. Chapter 40B applies to every Massachusetts municipality where
less than 10% of housing can be classified as affordable. It confers special privileges on any
developer who proposes building a project of which 25% or more of its units are affordable to
low- and moderate-income households. If a developer proposes to build such a project at a site
which is zoned for the appropriate type of housing but is rejected by the local government, the
developer may appeal to a state Housing Appeals Committee. The development proposal can
then only be rejected for non-subjective planning objections, such as concerns over health or the
preservation of open space (Porter 2004a: 16). This process, also known as the “builder’s
remedy” is designed to ensure that developments containing affordable housing are not excluded
from a community for arbitrary or prejudicial reasons. However, no affordable housing is built if
developers don’t take the initiative in creating it. In attempts to address this weakness, a
subsequent ordinance and executive order inserted stricter requirements into the Massachusetts
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law, but its fundamental design remains the same. Other states such as Connecticut and Rhode
Island have since passed similar laws, although one evaluation of New England states’ builder’s
remedy laws finds a limited ability to increase the supply of suburban affordable housing (qtd. in
Porter 2004a: 32).
Inclusionary zoning is often adopted independently by municipalities. The first inclusionary
zoning ordinance was adopted in Fairfax County, Virginia in 1971. However, it was overturned
by the Virginia Supreme Court two years later, as the County lacked legal authority to implement
such a law. The ordinance was also ruled to be an illegal “taking” under constitutional law for
having imposed excessive restrictions on private developers, depriving them of profit without
just compensation. Virginia law was eventually revised to allow Fairfax County to again
implement an inclusionary zoning ordinance in 1990, this time with incentives and cost offsets
provided to housing developers. Much before then, however, other municipalities would adopt
inclusionary zoning ordinances of their own. Montgomery County, Maryland- Fairfax County’s
neighbor across the Potomac- adopted an inclusionary zoning ordinance in 1974, having learned
from Fairfax County’s mistakes. This ordinance is certainly the most well-known in the literature
on inclusionary zoning. It requires that housing developments of a certain minimum size set
aside between 12.5 and 15% of their units for households earning below 60% of the Area
Median Income (AMI). For-sale, homeownership units must remain at this affordability level for
10 years, and rental units must remain affordable for 20 years (Porter 2004a 11). The local
housing agencies of Montgomery County are also given the opportunity to purchase up to 40%
of these units when their initial period of affordability expires. This further subsidization makes
the units affordable to households with even lower income. These components of the ordinance
have contributed to its enormous success; it has directly produced over 11,000 inclusionary units
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since its inception (Anderson 2003: 20). Municipalities across the country have adopted and
modified Montgomery County’s ordinance for their own inclusionary zoning programs, to
varying degrees of success.
Finally, many inclusionary zoning ordinances exist as the products of a process in between
that of independently adopting an ordinance and having the “builder’s remedy” be mandated by a
State. Most examples of these ordinances are in New Jersey and California. Localities in New
Jersey are required to meet their State-determined “fair share” of the region’s affordable housing
needs as the result of two State Supreme Court rulings known as Mount Laurel I (1975) and
Mount Laurel II (1983). Every New Jersey municipality must have outlined in the housing
element of its master plan how its “fair share” is to be met. The New Jersey Fair Housing Act of
1985 recommends inclusionary zoning as one method for municipalities to meet their legal
obligations, and the builder’s remedy is imposed as a penalty for noncompliance (Tustian 2000:
23). This approach has created de facto inclusionary housing in about 250 New Jersey
municipalities, and the construction of about 29,000 affordable units as of 2001 (Burchell 2000:
4; Porter 2004a: 19). Since the 1970’s, California municipalities have been required to plan
similarly for affordable housing. The California Department of Housing and Community
Development (HCD) can only review these plans, however, and cannot mandate changes beyond
stopping the issuance of building permits. And even if a locality does have a satisfactory plan for
providing affordable housing, there is little government enforcement for making sure such
housing is actually built, although private lawsuits have been occasionally filed against localities
to force them to meet their legal obligations (Calavita 1998: 154). HCD’s position towards
inclusionary zoning has varied over the years along with California’s shifting politics and
economic conditions. Two constants, however, have been California’s Density Bonus Law and
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Community Redevelopment Law. The Density Bonus Law, passed in 1979, requires that eligible
developments- those with 25% of their units designated as affordable- be awarded a 25% bonus
to the maximum development density allowed by a municipality’s zoning code. And the
Community Redevelopment Law requires that 30% of housing units built by redevelopment
agencies be affordable, and 15% of all housing units built in redevelopment areas be affordable.
These policies have evidently had an encouraging effect on the adoption of inclusionary zoning
in California. As of 2007, 170 out of California’s 527 cities and counties had adopted
inclusionary housing programs in some form (Calavita 1998: 154; NPH 2007: 3). While this
number may seem modest, this is almost a three-fold increase from 1994, with 63 California
municipalities having adopted these programs in only the four years prior to 2007 (NPH 2007:
3). It is estimated that about 30,000 affordable units have been produced through these programs
(NPH 2007: 11). Other States have housing policies similar to those of New Jersey and
Massachusetts. About half of the States require local governments to plan to meet housing needs,
and a few specifically mention using inclusionary zoning, but none are as progressive or
successful in implementing inclusionary zoning as California and New Jersey have been (Porter
2004a: 7).
Inclusionary housing programs in Massachusetts, Montgomery County, New Jersey and
California account for the majority of inclusionary housing produced, but inclusionary zoning is
geographically diverse, and more so every year (Porter 2004b: 241). Inclusionary zoning has
been adopted in places as widespread as Boulder, Colorado; Burlington, Vermont; Santa Fe,
New Mexico; Chapel Hill, North Carolina; Yonkers, New York; and Highland Park, Illinois.
And whereas inclusionary zoning programs were previously adopted mostly in suburbs, they are
increasingly being applied to large cities such as San Diego, Denver, Boston, and San Francisco.
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Advocates are pushing strongly for cities such as Los Angeles and New York City to develop
their inclusionary housing programs more fully, as well. Inclusionary zoning has also been
adopted by entire counties, like Montgomery and Howard County in Maryland or Fairfax and
Loudoun County in Virginia (Porter 2004b: 240). Inclusionary housing is now even found
internationally, in countries like Canada, Australia, and India (NPH 2007: 3). Inclusionary
zoning is on the rise, and shows great potential as a policy tool, if properly implemented. The
task ahead is to find and apply what works best, so that its use may continue to expand.

Existing Remedies for Affordable Housing Needs
The need is pressing for more affordable housing nationwide. A widely-used definition of
housing affordability is that a household spend no more than 30% of its budget on total housing
expenses. Affordable housing is commonly understood to mean housing which is affordable to
households with moderate-, low-, very low-, or extremely low-incomes relative to the Area
Median Income (AMI), a measure of average income in the local area. Definitions vary, but
moderate-income is usually considered to be 80-120% AMI; low-income is 50-80% AMI; very
low-income is 30-50% AMI; and extremely low-income is below 30% AMI (NPH 2007: 8). The
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) calculates the AMI’s on which
municipalities base their housing policy. HUD estimates that 12 million renter and owner
households spend more than 50% of their incomes on housing, and that, “The economic
expansion of the 1990s obscured certain trends and statistics that point to an increased, not
decreased, need for affordable housing” (“Affordable Housing”). Between 1985 and 1999, the
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number of rental units affordable to lower-income households declined by 9.5% as rental costs
rose faster than inflation-adjusted incomes (qtd. in Porter 2004a: 5). And in 2005, 42 million
American households- 100 million Americans- lived in physically deficient or unaffordable
housing (qtd. in Schwartz 2010: 1). These housing problems are especially concentrated among
low-income households: 91% of renters and 57% of homeowners with severe cost burdens are in
the bottom quartile of the income distribution (Schwartz 2010: 29). These affordable housing
needs are urgent, but inadequately met by current housing programs. In fact, federal funding for
affordable housing has been on the overall decline since the 1970’s. Inclusionary zoning expert
Douglas Porter observes that “except for the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program, federal
incentives to encourage low- and moderate-income housing starts have largely disappeared”
(Porter 2004a: 5).
The affordable housing subsidized by the federal government is done so through a
patchwork of programs administered by HUD. Historically, public housing has probably been
the most notorious of these programs. The concentration of poverty into isolated environments
has been acknowledged as a mistake, and has not surprisingly led to high levels of crime, social
apathy, and poor health and education outcomes. A popular perception of public housing as
existing in high-rise, semi-abandoned buildings was probably exaggerated. In 1984, only 17% of
the nation’s 1.3 million public housing units were located in family high-rise buildings (Merriam
1985: 103). Public housing was typically “modest in size”, “almost fully occupied”, and while
there were projects that fit the stereotype, these were “a distinct minority” (qtd. in Merriam 1985:
103). Nevertheless, since the 1970’s the federal government has been pursuing other means of
providing for affordable housing. These alternative programs are still funded by HUD but allow
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states and local governments more discretion in how the funding is spent, within certain
guidelines.
One of these alternative programs is the Housing Choice Voucher Program, more
commonly known as “Section 8”. Section 8 may be tenant-based or project-based. Under the
tenant-based subprogram housing vouchers are distributed directly to people unable to afford
average housing. The vouchers guarantee that those people will spend no more than 30% of their
income on housing expenses for a residence which is fair-market priced. A holder of this section
8 voucher therefore has access to the general housing stock (assuming the voucher is accepted)
instead of being consigned to wherever low-income housing is available. And under the Section
8 project-based subprogram, rents of designated apartments are subsidized for anyone with low
enough income to qualify for residence. All residences that house Section 8 tenants must meet
federal housing quality standards. There is an appeal to this program for landlords since their rent
is guaranteed by the government whether the voucher holder can pay or not. However, there is
heavy competition and long waiting lines to become a voucher holder, and some landlords refuse
to accept these vouchers for discriminatory reasons, a practice which is often illegal under fair
housing laws.
Another federal program is that of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC). Under
this program the federal government gives subsidies to private housing developers who build
affordable housing. Development projects eligible for the tax credits must have at least 20% of
the units be affordable to households earning 50% or below AMI, or have 40% of the units be
affordable to households earning 60% or below AMI. LIHTC’s were responsible for the
construction of about 1.3 million affordable housing units between 1980 and 2000, helping
finance 90% of all affordable housing built during this period (Rusk 2005: 2). However, this
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program still tends to segregate affordable housing since much of its is clustered and is built for
the explicit purpose of being affordable, rather than integrated into the general housing stock so
that it is mostly indistinguishable from market-rate housing.
The advantage of inclusionary zoning is that it requires neither direct government
construction of housing, as with public housing projects, nor federal subsidization, as with
Section 8 or LIHTC. Inclusionary zoning takes place at a local level and according to the
discretion of local officials, so no external funding is necessary. Inclusionary zoning is also a
broad, fairly conceptual policy, whereas government programs, although administered by state
and city officials, are necessarily run according to a top-down, established set of rules. Local
governments may interpret “inclusionary zoning” to have a variety of meanings. There is
considerable flexibility in determining, among other things, what percentage of new housing
developments should be affordable (the “set-aside” rate), what income groups “affordable”
housing should be available to (income-targeting), and how long affordable units must remain at
the same discounted price. Housing developers are also often allowed to depart from the
guidelines established for inclusionary zoning programs under exceptional circumstances.
Despite the relative flexibility of inclusionary zoning as a housing policy, developers and
others may still oppose its adoption into law, especially when such a policy is mandatory.
Housing developers make the economic argument that when forced to price any of their units
below the market rate, they must either suffer a loss of profits or raise the price of their
remaining units to compensate, increasing housing prices and decreasing the housing supply. The
higher housing prices would effectively amount to a tax on housing for general homeowners to
subsidize the discounted units, and new housing would be stifled. Proponents of inclusionary
zoning respond that developers are often given enough incentives and discounts to offset the

15

higher costs incurred incorporating affordable housing into their developments, and that
numerous studies have found little evidence of any actual link between mandatory inclusionary
zoning and the pricing and creation of housing in affected markets. It would seem that
inclusionary zoning is least economically disruptive and most effective in creating affordable
housing when it is implemented in municipalities with robust housing markets undergoing
growth. However, it is true that if inclusionary zoning is implemented in places with weak or
stagnant housing markets, little affordable housing will be created, and potentially negative
economic effects are more likely to be exacerbated.
Others oppose inclusionary zoning because they feel that it does not address the root
issues that lead to housing being unaffordable, such as high land costs, developer fees, growth
controls, complicated permitting processes, etc. (CAR 2004: 43; Conine 2004: 36). The solution
proposed is for local governments to make it easier for developers to build housing and for the
government to build affordable housing itself. Other opponents of IZ argue that private
developers should not be required to build affordable housing, because they may not have the
skills and experience to build and market the units, as well as ensure their long-term affordability
(Werwath 1994: 7). Likewise, some feel that entrusting private development with affordable
housing diverts funding from non-profit housing agencies which are more aligned with the
interests of low-income households and would be more responsive to their needs (Pyatok 2004:
50). These are valid arguments for debate, but much is dependent on how exactly inclusionary
zoning ordinances are designed. The specifics behind inclusionary zoning are therefore taken up
next.
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Common Components of Inclusionary Zoning Ordinances
There are many elements that must be in place for an inclusionary zoning ordinance to be
successful. In crafting an inclusionary zoning ordinance many economic, political, and social
factors must be taken into consideration. Ordinances should be sensitive to the particular needs
of a municipality, and may vary greatly from each other in regard to their specific provisions.
Nevertheless, highlighting how common issues are addressed gives an idea how an ordinance
can be designed so as to be both effective and fair.
The following are elements common to most inclusionary zoning ordinances.
Set-Aside Rate: The percentage of units required to be affordable out of the total number of
housing units in a new development. A set-aside rate of 15% is most common, but this can vary
depending on the income targeting of the ordinance (discussed below) and a host of other factors
(Rusk 2005: 2). In California, for example, inclusionary zoning set-aside rates range from 50%
in Placer County to 6% in Vista (qtd. in Porter 2004b: 227).
Income Targeting: The income groups for which the affordable units are intended. An
inclusionary ordinance may be designed with a certain income group in mind, or may be
structured so that multiple income groups are served. Typically moderate and low- income
groups are targeted, although Sacramento recently became the first municipality to inclusionary
zoning to extremely low-income households (NPH 2007: 31). The income targeting of an
ordinance should not be viewed separately from its set-aside rate, since knowing both is
necessary to evaluate what kind of an impact will be had on the need for affordable housing.
Income targeting may also be set at different levels for rental and for-sale housing. If fewer
buyers or renters of a certain income group apply for housing than are provided for in the
ordinance, income restrictions are sometimes relaxed to maintain occupancy. However, this
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would be uncommon since demand for affordable housing so often exceeds supply that housing
agencies must keep waiting lists and hold lotteries to select applicants.
Program Incidence: The housing developments to which an inclusionary zoning ordinance
applies. A zoning ordinance may be always be in effect for all residential development, or may
only be in effect for certain zoning districts or types of development, or may only become
applicable upon certain occasions (Porter 2004b: 221). Inclusionary zoning is also usually
applicable only to development projects of a certain minimum size, or “trigger” point. A typical
trigger point is when a development contains 10 or more units, but this can vary from 1 unit to
upwards of 50.
The developments to which an ordinance applies may be further limited to only certain
types of property, such as those zoned for lots of a particular size, redevelopment areas, or cityowned property. In the case where a zoning ordinance specifies that all developments must
adhere to inclusionary requirements, but in which a development may have too few units to
produce any affordable housing given the mandated set-aside rate (say, if a five-unit
development were required to set aside 10% of its units) then developers may exempted from
some of the requirements (discussed in Alternatives to On-Site Construction). Exemptions may
also be granted to developments in which including affordable units would constitute a “unique
hardship”, or which are judged to meet enough of the affordable housing need without being
subject to inclusionary requirements, such as high-rise multifamily buildings.
An ordinance may also seek to integrate affordable units into multiple types of housing,
rather than solely new developments. To this end, inclusionary requirements may also be
satisfied through the rehabilitation of affordable units, conversion of market units to affordable
units, or construction of accessory units (Porter 2004b: 226). Applying inclusionary zoning to the
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rehabilitation of existing housing in addition to the construction of new housing is especially
important in cities which lack adequate affordable housing and are undergoing gentrification.
Unit Appearance: The size, amenities, and dispersal of affordable units within a housing
development. Most inclusionary zoning ordinances allow affordable units to be smaller and have
fewer amenities than neighboring market-rate units, within limits. This reduces the costs
developers must incur for building units which yield less of a profit. However, both developers
and government officials have an interest in ensuring that affordable units are not easily
distinguishable from any other units. Developers may be worried about homebuyers or renters
who are discomforted by the thought of living next to affordable housing. And government
officials will likely be concerned about the social integration of the residents of affordable units,
and will at least try to ensure that developers don’t build substandard units to meet their
inclusionary requirements. One method developers have of disguising affordable housing to look
like surrounding housing is to “piggyback” units, wherein two or more for-sale units are
designed to look like a single unit from the street (NHC 2000: 31). Methods like these have
enabled developers to place together housing units with disparate prices but without any obvious
distinction in appearance. For example, one development in Fairfax County, Virginia groups four
$125,000 townhomes next to $800,000 single-family estates, making them nearly
indistinguishable from each other (Brown 2001: 26).
Cost Offsets and Incentives: Local government measures and incentives that partially or wholly
compensate developers for the revenue lost on affordable units. This is perhaps the most
controversial aspect of an inclusionary ordinance, due in part to the fact that establishing a “fair”
level of cost offsets can be so difficult. The need for cost offsets is typically determined by
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conducting an economic feasibility analysis, taking into consideration factors such as cost of
land, normal developer profit margins, construction costs, and fees. Cost offsets and incentives
may be provided as standard practice or negotiated on a case-by-case basis. This ties into the
debate over the “economic incidence” of inclusionary zoning and will be taken up later. Below,
however, are some examples of what form these cost offsets might take.
•

Density Bonus: Permission granted to a developer to build more housing units on a site
than would otherwise be allowed under a municipality’s zoning code. Density bonuses
are the most common cost offset, and “generally allow about a 20% increase in on-site
units” (Porter 2004b: 227). The set-aside rate may or may not apply to units added to a
development as a result of receiving a density bonus.

•

Design Flexibility: Permission granted to a developer to build housing to specifications
which would not otherwise be allowed under a municipality’s zoning code. Relaxed
parking requirements are one example of this. Specifically, a developer may be allowed
to provide fewer parking spaces than the zoning code requires (partly under the rationale
that tenants of affordable housing generally need less parking space). Denver is one
municipality that provides such an offset, with “10 required parking spaces waived for
each affordable unit, up to 20% of original parking requirements” (“Inclusionary Zoning”
2003). Other design specifications which might be made more flexible include: setback
from the street or property line; floor-to-area ratio; minimum lot size; lot coverage; and
road width.

•

Fee Waivers/Reductions/Deferrals: Waiving, reducing, or allowing delayed payment of
impact fees and permit fees typically required of new developments. Longmont,
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California, for example, waives up to 14 permitting fees in exchange for the developer’s
voluntary provision of more affordable units or units of deeper affordability than
required. Fee waivers and reductions can represent substantial savings for developers- in
the case of Longmont, the average fee is $3,250 per single-family home and $2,283 per
apartment unit (“Inclusionary Zoning” 2003). Fee deferrals can be just as attractive to
developers as fee reductions by lowering the development carrying costs (expenses
associated with an investment, such as interest payments on pre-development loans). This
could be accomplished by simply allowing the developer to postpone paying fees until
the certificate of occupancy is received, rather than upon application for the building
permit.

•

Fast-Track Permitting: Expediting the permitting process so that development can take
place at a faster rate. This can also represent substantial savings through the reduction of
carrying costs. In Sacramento, inclusionary zoning projects go through a 90-day
permitting process rather than a more typical 9-12 month permitting process. The average
estimated savings from this are $250,000 per project (“Inclusionary Zoning” 2003).

Alternatives to On-Site Construction: Allowing housing developers to contribute to the supply
of affordable housing without actually including affordable units in their developments. These
alternatives commonly take the form of in-lieu fees, off-site units, land dedication, and unit
credits. The motivations for developers to choose these alternatives “range from anxieties about
the marketing effects of mixing poorer folks with wealthier ones, to reducing development costs
for low-income units, to avoiding the design and administrative headaches of building affordable
units in a market-rate development” (Porter 2004b: 229). Calavita adds that most housing
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developers, “…have little experience building low-income housing and scant motivation to enter
an unfamiliar market perceived to entail a high degree of risk” (164).
The use of these will probably result in less of an improvement in the housing stock’s
inclusiveness, but may have the same effect in improving its overall affordability. Because the
affordable units are not being included in market-rate developments but are instead being
constructed elsewhere, the degree of housing segregation will remain the same, if not worsen.
The production of affordable housing may also be delayed, if the off-site affordable units aren’t
required to be produced at the same time as the market-rate units. In-lieu fees must accrue over
time before financing development with them becomes feasible, finding land for off-site units
may be politically risky, and additional administrative time and effort must be spent managing
in-lieu fees and off-site units if they are allowed as alternatives to construction (Porter 2004a:
34).
However, these alternatives may also be necessary, or even beneficial, in other ways. A
development project may be located on too small a parcel of land or be designed at too high of a
density such that a density bonus or other cost offsets would be unusable. In these cases and
others where requiring the inclusion of on-site affordable units would present a “unique
hardship” for developers and would render the project economically infeasible, the availability of
these alternatives provides a way for inclusionary zoning to still be used towards the end of
creating affordable housing. By contributing to an affordable housing trust fund in lieu of
actually constructing affordable units, a developer may indirectly help finance the creation of
affordable housing when a public housing agency or non-profits tap into this fund to pay other
affordable housing developers. Whether a lesser, same, or greater number of affordable units is
produced from in-lieu fees compared to if the developers had constructed the units themselves
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depends on the size of the fees. In-lieu fees are frequently based on measures such as the floor
area of the housing development, the number of housing units, or the difference in price between
the market-rate units and affordable units multiplied by the number of affordable units that
would have been set aside. In-lieu fees should ideally lead to the production of an equivalent or
greater number of off-site affordable units so that developers don’t simply opt to pay in-lieu fees
for being the less costly of the two alternatives. But the fees vary greatly among different
municipalities. For example, developers in Pleasanton, California must pay only $600 for every
affordable unit not produced, but $36,000 per unit in Oceanside, California (qtd. in Porter 2004b:
229). And the inclusionary housing program of Montgomery County, Maryland has allowed the
contribution of fees in lieu of development only eleven times in its over 30 year history
(“Developing an IZ Ordinance” 6). In-lieu fees may also depend on an ordinance’s set-aside rate
and income targeting, and may only be permissible for developments below a certain threshold
size.
Another alternative developers may opt for is constructing affordable housing off-site.
This may be an especially attractive alternative for developers if the location of a planned
development is on particularly expensive land. The off-site location is often still in the same
jurisdiction, though, and the off-site units may be required to be built simultaneously and in
greater number than they would have existed otherwise. The third and fourth alternatives to
including on-site affordable units in a market-rate development are land dedication and unit
credits. Under the first alternative, the developer dedicates land to be used exclusively for the
future construction of affordable housing. Under the second alternative, the developer purchases
credits for affordable units from other developers who previously built more affordable units
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than were required. However, these two options don’t appear to be made as widely available as
in-lieu fees and off-site construction.
Resale Controls/Duration of Affordability: How long an inclusionary unit must remain
affordable, and what happens to it after its period of affordability has expired. Inclusionary units
are usually not required to stay affordable forever. Most are set to remain affordable for 10-30
years although some for-sale units may revert to their market price as soon as the first
homebuyer moves out, while others units are set to remain affordable for perpetuity(Porter
2004b: 230). Usually affordable rental units must retain their below-market price for longer than
affordable for-sale units, in cases where an inclusionary zoning ordinance treats the two
differently. Allowing the affordability of inclusionary units to expire seems counterproductive
but serves a legitimate purpose beyond the interests of developers. Buyers of affordable homes
will be able to benefit from a higher resale price if the value of the home is allowed to appreciate
over time. These homebuyers will also have more of an incentive to provide upkeep and make
improvements to their homes. However, many ordinances also have provisions protecting against
the total reversion to market prices once a unit’s period of affordability has expired. Some
municipalities reserve a “right of first refusal” on affordable units, meaning that the municipality,
or a housing agency or non-profit organization on its behalf, is given the first chance to resell
affordable units as they come on the market. The units are sold either at the same affordable
price- preserving the quantity of affordable units- or at a higher, market price- allowing the
municipality to recoup some of the costs incurred from running an inclusionary housing
program. Even if the right of first refusal is not exercised, usually an ownership agreement is
made between the municipality and the homebuyer [or renter] specifying that any “increase in
sales price be shared by the owner and the agency administering the program” (Porter 2004b:
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231). The municipality’s share of the increase in sales price is then deposited back into its
affordable housing trust fund.
Supplementary Programs for Greater Affordability: Further subsidizing affordable units to
reach income levels below those which a developer is required to target. Greater affordability
can be achieved by: mandating that some portion of the inclusionary units be made available to
Sec.8 voucher holders; offering homebuyer assistance to purchasers of the units; or, allowing
public agencies or non-profits to purchase or rent the units for further subsidization. Mandating
that inclusionary units be made available to Sec.8 voucher holders combines local housing policy
with federal housing policy, creating savings for the Sec. 8 program, making more units
available to potential Sec. 8 tenants, and reducing landlord discrimination since the units can
only be designated for affordable housing. Homebuyer assistance is offered in Fairfax County,
Virginia, where low interest rate mortgages covering all housing costs are made available to
those earning under 70% AMI, resulting in 30% of inclusionary for-sale units in the county being
purchased by people with less than 40% AMI (“Inclusionary Zoning”). Another approach is for a
local housing authority or non-profit agency to be granted right of first refusal to purchase or rent
inclusionary units. The housing authority or non-profit agency may then further subsidize the
units’ cost to a level of affordability beyond what a municipality is willing to mandate.
Montgomery County, Maryland is the most well-known and successful example of this. The
Housing Opportunities Commission (HOC) is allowed to rent or purchase up to a third of
inclusionary units before anyone else, and HOC-approved non-profits are allowed right of first
refusal after this on an additional 7% of inclusionary units (“Inclusionary Zoning”). The HOC
purchased 1,722 for-sale units between 1974 and 2005 and annually rents 1,000-1,500 rental
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units, making these units available to very low-income households and extremely low-income
households who would otherwise not be able to afford them (Rusk 2005: 2).
Preferential Marketing: A stated preference for a certain type of resident. Some ordinances,
such as Santa Fe, New Mexico’s, express a preference for housing current residents of the city,
employees of the local government, and anyone working in the city, often in hierarchical order
(“Developing an IZ Ordinance” 10). This can be controversial if exercising such preferences in
selecting occupants of affordable housing serves to perpetuate economic or racial segregation.

Inception: The manner in which an inclusionary housing program is first adopted. It should be
pointed out that inclusionary zoning ordinances may not always be legislated as ordinances unto
themselves, but rather incorporated into broader ordinances or ordinances pertaining to specific
types of development (Porter 2004b: 221). Inclusionary requirements may also be separate laws
entirely, distinct from the zoning code and administered by a housing department rather than a
zoning office, as is the case in Montgomery County, Maryland. An inclusionary housing
program may also be initiated by Executive Order, as in Boston, or court ordered. However, no
matter how an inclusionary zoning program is started, it is almost always supported by a larger,
existing affordable housing program behind the scenes.
General Strength of Requirements: Not all inclusionary zoning programs are strictly
mandatory. Programs may be “mandatory, mandatory with incentives, voluntary under
prescribed conditions, or voluntary through ad hoc negotiated agreements” (Porter 2004b: 221).
Mandatory programs without any compensatory incentives at all are rare, but can be found in
places such as Boulder, Colorado and Carlsbad, California. On the other end of the spectrum are
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places such as Chicago or New York City with inclusionary programs which consist of little
more than protocol for negotiating with developers or a standard package of incentives made
available to any developer who voluntarily meets certain affordability criteria. The consensus in
the literature is that mandatory programs generally create more affordable housing and for lowerincome people than voluntary programs. Studies of the inclusionary programs in Massachusetts
and the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area show that a mandatory approach was critical to the
programs’ success (Brunick 2004a: 3). A similar study of the inclusionary programs in California
reaches the same conclusion. The fifteen most productive programs were all mandatory, and two
municipalities with less productive programs, “specifically blame the voluntary nature of their
programs for stagnant production [of affordable housing] despite a market-rate boom” (Brunick
2004a: 2-3).
One reason for the greater success of mandatory programs is that with non-mandatory
programs much greater incentives would have to be offered for developers to voluntarily produce
the same amount of affordable housing, or for the same income levels. It is reported that,
“Voluntary inclusionary zoning programs that do succeed in generating affordable housing units
for a range of low-income households must rely heavily on federal, state, and local subsidies in
most cases”(Brunick 2004a: 4). Another reason for the preferability of mandatory programs is
the development atmosphere they create, where development of affordable housing is both less
stigmatized and more predictable. A housing developer may be reluctant to propose building
affordable housing in a community if a community backlash is expected. Richard Dubin, a
Maryland developer, says that, “If one developer did it [constructed affordable housing], he
would be looked upon as bringing low-income people to your neighborhood” (NHC 2000: 31).
Developer David Flanagan echoes Dubin’s statement, agreeing that people may resist having
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affordable housing nearby, “…but if it is mandated for everyone it is not as important to them”
(NHC 2000: 32). Having the program be mandatory would reduce this disincentive. The other
positive impact a mandatory program has on the development atmosphere is the greater
predictability developers have in planning a project when what they can be expected to give and
receive is known in advance rather than negotiated. An article in the Journal of the American
Planning Association declares that, “The worst barrier to housing production and constricted
supply is an unpredictable development atmosphere…Development decisions are usually fraught
with community politics and can be applied unfairly to different developers depending upon their
political connections. Under a mandatory inclusionary housing program, developers will always
know up front what is required of them” (Brunick 2004a: 4). Indeed, for this reason developers
in Irvine, California took the initiative to request that the city council revise Irvine’s voluntary
inclusionary housing ordinance to be mandatory (Brunick 2004a: 4). In contrast, only one
mandatory inclusionary housing program was ever made voluntary, owing to local political
reasons and gross mismanagement of the program (Jacobus 2007: 1; Brunick 2004c: 8).
Subsequent to the change much fewer affordable units were produced annually (Brunick 2004a:
6).
The current trend is for new inclusionary housing programs to be mandatory, and it is this
type of program that this paper primarily addresses. However, it should be mentioned that is
theoretically possible for a voluntary program to be just as successful. With enough incentives
and cost offsets and a local government especially committed to producing affordable housing,
developers may be just as compelled to participate voluntarily as if they were required to do so.
One example of a successful voluntary program is in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, where, “The
program is so rigorously marketed by town staff and the town council that no new residential
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developer…has approached the planning commission without at least a 15 percent affordable
housing component or plans to pay a fee in lieu of building affordable units” (Brunick 2004a: 3).
Developers in Chapel Hill view the program as being effectively mandatory since development
proposals without affordable housing are so much more difficult to be approved (Brunick 2004a:
3). Thus the same results are achieved but with less risk of developers challenging inclusionary
requirements in court. But for a voluntary program to work, it is essential that such a program be
implemented by a local government with the actual intention of creating affordable housing, and
not with the superficial intention of satisfying a State or court mandate. Voluntary programs may
be less successful not so much because of their inherent nature, but because the adoption of
voluntary standards reflect an underlying apathy towards the goals of such a program. Whether
mandatory or not, the involvement of a local government in managing its inclusionary housing
program is one of the foremost determinants of its success.
Program Administration: The management and oversight of an inclusionary housing program.
This may be the key to the success of an inclusionary zoning ordinance, more than any other
single factor. It is wrong to assume inclusionary housing will automatically be created simply by
passing an inclusionary zoning ordinance. The administrative requirements of a successful
program must include: oversight of production, pricing units to be affordable, marketing to
eligible residents and monitoring of units to verify owner occupancy and payment of fees
(Jacobus 2007: 3). For-sale units may bear the additional administrative requirements of:
educating buyers about ownership requirements, screening eligible buyers, providing additional
home financing if necessary, and managing the resale of units (Jacobus 2007: 3). The California
Association of Realtors states in a policy briefing paper that resale controls and other
mechanisms for ensuring long-term affordability probably create the greatest demand for
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program supervision, due to complicated legal and title issues requiring enforcement (CAR
2004: 45). Rick Jacobus, in a PolicyLink article on inclusionary housing administration, writes
that, “When these administrative responsibilities come as a surprise, program managers often
find it difficult to respond to developer needs and to track and monitor the affordable units that
are produced. Failure to provide adequate staffing and systems for ongoing administration can
result in loss of affordable units either directly through illegal sales, subletting, or foreclosure or
indirectly by undermining public support for the inclusionary housing program” (Jacobus 2007:
1). He cites the examples of Orange County and Santa Barbara County, California, as program
administration horror stories. In Orange County, the workload became so overwhelming that the
Housing Authority entrusted with the program’s oversight was forced to release units from their
affordable restrictions, and many of the remaining deed restrictions were ruled to be
unenforceable by a judge (Jacobus 2007: 1-2). And the inclusionary housing program in Santa
Barbara was almost shut down after it was revealed that, “…as many as quarter of the county’s
400 inclusionary homebuyers were illegally using their homes for rental income, nine homes had
been lost through foreclosure and several owners had taken out mortgages far in excess of their
homes’ restricted value (Jacobus 2007: 3). Programs may also fail to adequately track all the
affordable units being created. Mukhija et al. in their analysis of inclusionary zoning in Los
Angeles and Orange Counties find that most of the cities they surveyed “are not robustly
monitoring the affordable housing delivered through their inclusionary programs” (248).
Adequate program administration is clearly essential, but a local government doesn’t
have to be solely responsible for performing this task. Jacobus points out that this responsibility
can be taken by a competent private contractor, a nonprofit housing agency or shared among
several local jurisdictions with a joint administration staff (10-11). The actual costs of
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administration are also fairly low. Economies of scale reduce costs for larger programs, and the
monitoring of rental units is reported to be much less staff intensive than the monitoring of forsale units (Jacobus 2007: 12). Jacobus recommends a staff of about one full-time employee for
every 140 to 400 for-sale units, or every 600 to 1,000 rental units (12). Montgomery County,
Maryland, one of the most successful inclusionary housing programs in the country, is reported
to have no more than six full-time employees on its administration staff (Jacobus 2007: 12).
Furthermore, a local government can draw on an assortment of revenue sources for funding
program administration. The best idea seems to be for the funding to be tied to the size of the
program itself, such as through resale, administration, or ground lease fees, so that the program
doesn’t outgrow the revenue allocated to it under a general budget. In summation, Jacobus
writes, “While the cost of properly administering and monitoring inclusionary housing programs
can be surprising, there is no reason to see these costs as prohibitive. Relative to the resources
being invested in creating inclusionary housing, the cost of monitoring and sustaining that
housing is very modest, even for the most intensive programs” (15). To avoid wasting a
program’s potential, its needs and expenses should be anticipated and planned for well in
advance. Investing in inclusionary housing requires a moral and material dedication to its
objectives, but if done right, the benefits can far outweigh the costs.
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Legal Issues
The legality of inclusionary zoning was first addressed in a series of court cases in the
1970’s and 1980’s. The most famous and influential court decisions of this time came out of the
New Jersey Supreme Court in two decisions known as Mount Laurel I (1975) and Mount Laurel
II (1983). Mount Laurel I (South Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel)
ruled that New Jersey towns must provide their “fair share” of regional affordable housing and
that, “Developing communities must make realistically possible the opportunity for an
appropriate variety and choice of housing for all categories of people who wish to live there”
(qtd. in Porter 2004a: 18). After local resistance to the decision, Mount Laurel II reaffirmed the
ruling and added teeth to it by implementing the “builder’s remedy” and other measures.
Unfortunately these rulings were later watered down by legislative action, but they stand as
prime examples of how affirmatively creating affordable housing can be legally justified, if not
legally necessary for providing for the general welfare and eliminating discriminatory policies.
The arguments considered in Mount Laurel I, Mount Laurel II, and relevant cases
concern the issue of government intervention in housing markets through “development
exactions” and at what point this intervention unreasonably infringes on private property, given
the necessity of righting a wrong or providing for the general welfare. Development exactions
are requirements for land dedications, fees, or public services imposed on developers as
conditions for receiving building permits. There is a established precedent of municipalities
using development exactions for different purposes, the rationale being that they mitigate some
kind of negative externality caused by the development, and thus are justified impositions on the
developer. For example, since the mid-1980’s many central cities have exacted “linkage fees”
from developers of commercial and industrial space on the basis that such development
inevitably creates a need for workforce housing. These linkage fees are used to finance the

32

construction of affordable housing or are deposited into an affordable housing trust fund.
However, one of the difficulties of imposing exactions on developers is that exactions are not as
legally well-established as common taxes and are only levied on a small subset of the general
population. Imposing development exactions on housing developers, in particular, is even less
well-established. In the view of the courts, exactions are constitutionally justified on the basis
that the authority to impose exactions on private development derives from the power of the
States to “promote the general welfare”. But excessive imposition, to the point where an
individual is deprived of private property “without just compensation” is said to constitute an
illegal “taking”.
Court precedent indicates that for a development exaction to be legal there must be an
essential nexus between the need created by a development and the use of its exaction, and that
this exaction should be roughly proportional to the need. Specifically, there are two primary
judicial “tests” commonly applied to exactions to determine their legality if ever challenged in
court. One of these is the uniquely attributable test, which requires that an exaction target only
those needs which directly arise out of a specific development. For example, an exaction that
requires a suburban housing developer to help pay for new street lamps would meet this
requirement. It may be harder to make the same case for affordable housing, since the need for
such housing is not directly created by new development nor attributable to any one project. An
exception to this might be when affordable or mixed-income housing is replaced with higherincome housing, displacing low-income residents. But in the case of new housing development,
the need for affordable housing is more tenuously attributed to the expectation that any new
development ultimately leads to the creation of new jobs, some being low-income and requiring
appropriate housing.
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Another test used by courts in assessing the legality of inclusionary zoning is the
proportionality test. This test only requires that an exaction be reasonably proportionate to the
needs created by a development project and similar development projects over time. This test
takes a more comprehensive, long-term view of development rather than treating every
development project as a separate entity. Despite its apparent weakness in meeting the uniquely
attributable test, inclusionary zoning is usually held to be legal due to courts taking the broader
proportionality test. Developers might raise two other objections in regard to the proportionality
of an IZ ordinance. One is that are larger projects are disproportionately burdened if only
projects of a certain minimum size are subject to inclusionary requirements. The other objection
is that the need for affordable housing is not only created by new development but existing
development, as well, and so inclusionary requirements should not be solely applied to new
housing. The first objection can be satisfied by requiring developers to pay in-lieu fees if a
development is too small to meet the inclusionary threshold, but the second objection is less
easily addressed. Thomas Kleven writes that, “One possible answer is that new development is
required only to provide for the additional low-cost housing needs it creates. Another is that
existing development also contributes to the provision of low-cost housing through rent control,
condominium-conversion regulation, housing-code enforcement, or even property taxes”
(Merriam 1985: 124). Others, such as Daniel Mandelker, believe that exaction doctrine should
not be strictly applied to inclusionary zoning at all. Mandelker writes that “Exaction doctrine
developed as a limitation on the authority of local governments to shift to the private sector the
cost of facilities that the public sector normally assumes. This problem is not raised by
inclusionary zoning…inclusionary zoning merely requires a modification in the economic mix of
housing provided by the developer” (Merriam 1985: 35).
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In general, as long as an inclusionary ordinance is not grossly disproportionate and a
good faith effort seems to have been made to be as fair to developers as possible, courts are
likely to defer to the judgment of a municipality or legislature. To this end, provisions will often
be written into IZ ordinances explicitly stating the need for affordable housing, and ideally, the
municipality will also be able cite the results of a commissioned economic analysis into what
contributions developers can reasonably be expected to make and still be profitable.
Although courts have repeatedly ruled in favor of the constitutionality of inclusionary
zoning and a solid legal framework provides for its implementation, some developers argue that
it is nonetheless wrong to ask the private sector to supply a public good when such a good should
be supplied by the government. This may be a valid opinion, but it is an ideological one at that,
and does not delegitimize its legal standing in any way. It is particularly fallacious to claim that a
municipality does not have the right to exercise its zoning powers for any explicit inclusionary
objectives because doing so would demonstrate some socioeconomic agenda. As eloquently
stated in the Mount Laurel II decision in regard to inclusionary zoning ordinances:
“The contention that generally these devices are beyond the municipal power because they are
‘socio-economic’ is particularly inappropriate. The very basis for the constitutional obligation
underlying Mount Laurel is a belief, fundamental, that excluding a class of citizens from housing
on an economic basis (one that substantially corresponds to a socio-economic basis) distinctly
disserves the general welfare… It is nonsense to single out inclusionary zoning (providing a
realistic opportunity for the construction of lower income housing) and label it ‘socio-economic’
if that is meant to imply that other aspects of zoning are not. Detached single family residential
homes, high-rise multi-family zones of any kind, factory zones, recreational, open space,
conservation, and agricultural zones, regional shopping mall zones, indeed practically any
significant kind of zoning now used, has a substantial socio-economic motivation” (qtd. in
Merriam 1985: 2).
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Economic Incidence
Probably the most vociferous objections to inclusionary zoning come from housing
developers who claim that the practice of inclusionary zoning places an unjust burden on
them to provide affordable housing for the community, when such a task would be better left
to the government to provide, or left for the private market to provide on its own. Developers
often allege that the forced inclusion of affordable units in housing developments not only
makes housing production less economically feasible for developers, but also stifles the
housing market as a whole, leading to higher prices and less production, ultimately
undercutting the goals inclusionary zoning was designed to promote. Proponents of
inclusionary zoning reply that developers are provided with enough cost incentives and
discounts by local governments to offset any harm to developers’ bottom line, if not make
them better off than they would have been otherwise. The debate is a highly empirical one,
since ordinance requirements, cost offsets, and housing markets vary greatly from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
On the whole, empirical evidence indicates that inclusionary zoning does not suppress
housing production or lead to higher housing prices. One study in 2004 by the Reason Public
Policy Institute claimed to have found evidence that inclusionary zoning programs in the San
Francisco Bay Area were responsible for a subsequent decline in housing production.
However, this study has since been much maligned in the literature on the topic for not
controlling for other factors which may have affected housing production or including any
communities in the study without inclusionary zoning for the sake of comparison. More
rigorous analyses now find very little evidence for inclusionary zoning to have a dampening
effect on the housing market, and in some cases find that it may even stimulate production.
For example, a study of 28 California cities over 20 years, controlling for variables such as

36

unemployment rate, mortgage rate, and median housing price, showed that inclusionary
zoning did not stifle overall housing production, and that housing production actually
increased in cities such as San Diego, Irvine, and Sacramento after inclusionary housing
programs were adopted. (Brunick 2004c: 7). In a recent study, Mukhija et al. (2010) analyzed
the effects of inclusionary zoning on housing production in Los Angeles and Orange County
and similarly found no statistically significant correlation between adoption of mandatory
inclusionary zoning and housing supply (1). The Southern California Association of NonProfit Housing researched the productivity of inclusionary housing in seven Southern
California cities, speaking directly to city planners and local developers, analyzing the cities’
zoning codes and examining a number of economic and demographic factors, and also found
no effect of inclusionary housing on overall housing construction (SCANPH 2005: 3). And a
2003 study by the California Coalition for Rural Housing and the Non-Profit Housing
Association of Northern California, in perhaps the broadest study of California inclusionary
housing programs, finds no evidence that inclusionary zoning is slowing development,
regardless of the income-targeting undertaken (qtd. in Brunick 2003b: 10-11). Two older,
similar studies produced the same results (qtd. in Brunick 2003b:11). One study finds that
inclusionary zoning programs in California did have an impact on housing markets, but only
to produce a marginal shift from single family to multifamily housing production (Knaap
2008: 1).
California provides fertile grounds for research on the subject due to the number and
variety of inclusionary housing programs in the State. But several other studies have been
performed for the Washington D.C. metropolitan area and other places around the county, all
corroborating the conclusions of the California studies (Brunick 2003b: 11). A Center for
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Housing Policy report fails to find any municipality where inclusionary zoning has led to a
decrease in development (qtd. in Brunick 2003b: 12). And a policy brief on inclusionary
zoning prepared by Business and Professional People for the Public Interest reports that city
officials in a diverse range of cities, “all claim that they have not seen a decrease in
development activity in their communities since they implemented inclusionary housing
programs,” and in addition, “studies, analytical reports, and community and developer
reaction to inclusionary housing programs nationwide indicate that mandatory inclusionary
zoning programs in a wide variety of locations are not stifling development”(Brunick 2004c:
7). Less research appears to have directly explored the relationship between inclusionary
zoning and housing prices, but at least two studies have reached similar conclusions as the
studies on housing production. One study by the Innovative Housing Institute of the
inclusionary zoning programs in Montgomery County, MA and Fairfax County, VA found
no difference in price trends between market-rate units located adjacent to or near
inclusionary units and those located further away (qtd. in Fischer 2001: 2; Center for
Housing Policy 2000: 34-35). Another study by the Family Housing Fund of Minneapolis
found no difference in sales of market-rate housing following the construction of nearby
affordable housing (qtd. in Fischer 2001: 2). A 2008 study by the National Center for Smart
Growth Research and Education did find a small effect of inclusionary zoning on housing
prices in California: “housing prices in cities that adopted inclusionary zoning increased
about 2-3 percent faster than cities that did not adopt such policies,” and, “housing price
effects were greater in higher priced housing markets than lower priced markets” (Knaap
2008: 1).
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However, these studies should not be interpreted to imply that inclusionary zoning never
has a negative effect on housing prices or production, only that it does not necessarily have
such an effect. Robert Ellickson (1981) argued that the impact of inclusionary zoning on a
local housing market would depend on the market’s desirability. His argument makes
intuitive sense. In a highly desirable housing market potential renters and homeowners will
be willing to be more flexible in the prices they pay, so housing developers are better able to
pass on the cost of building affordable units by charging more for their other units. This
effectively creates a tax on all housing development to subsidize the creation of affordable
housing. Conversely, in a housing market which is stagnant and not especially desirable,
housing developers will find it harder to pass on the cost of building affordable units since
consumers are not as inclined to pay more than they have to. Consumers would be just as
willing to find somewhere else to live, so developers have less control over the prices they
set. In a market such as this, inclusionary zoning could plausibly depress production if
developers must develop elsewhere. Few, if any, developers would willingly operate in a
restrictive market if there was more of a profit to be made elsewhere.
Whether housing developers have big or small profit margins is largely irrelevant in
deciding whether to build inclusionary housing in a restrictive market. If their profit margins
are small and housing prices are inflexible then they may be simply unable to absorb the
higher costs and will choose to build elsewhere. Even if their profit margins are large, they
will have little incentive to construct housing under conditions where their profits are any
less than maximal. In making these observations I don’t mean to demonize housing
developers. Many development firms are small operations with moderate wages. If a
development firm doesn’t aim to maximize profits and minimize costs to its full capacity,
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competing firms may gain the competitive edge, putting all the employees of such a firm out
of work. A development firm may also have to achieve a certain profit for investors to
provide necessary financing. Thus, resistance to building inclusionary housing may be based
on considerations of economic survival and employee welfare rather than avarice and
indifference towards the needs of those with low and moderate incomes. Therefore, goodwill
negotiations between developers and city officials are essential in crafting inclusionary
zoning ordinances and determining on a case-by-case basis the extent of concessions each
side is prepared to make.
Much of the analysis concerning how developers must contend with the costs of
providing affordable housing may be moot, however. Developers almost always receive a set
of cost offsets such that building inclusionary housing is approximately cost neutral. Studies
of San Diego, Washington D.C., New Jersey, and Salinas, CA have indicated that cost offsets
and strong housing markets are sufficient to compensate developers for any profits lost
through inclusionary housing (Brunick 2003b: 12). Moreover, researchers have more recently
criticized Ellickson’s study for overstating the price effects of inclusionary zoning, instead
arguing that housing market prices are unlikely to be totally inflexible, and that the
implementing inclusionary zoning would rarely be counterproductive in regard to creating
affordable housing And as for any costs developers might bear for providing affordable
housing which are not offset by the local government, it is claimed that these costs are further
passed on to the original landowners on whose land the housing is built. (qtd. in Calavita
1998: 152) If a landowner owns a parcel of land in a municipality with inclusionary zoning,
all future housing developments proposed for that site will be subject to the same
inclusionary requirements, so the landowner will have no choice but to accept a discounted
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purchase price on all offers made by developers for the land. Since every housing developer
knows that every other developer will face the same additional costs, a developer could offer
less for the land without concern of being underbid. Calavita and Grimes claim that there
seems to a consensus in the literature that in the long-run, most of the costs imposed on
developers are indeed passed backwards to landowners (Calavita 1998: 152). If this is true, in
the long-run the effects of any incentives and cost offsets offered to developers would only
be to sustain increases in the value of land held by landowners (qtd. in Calavita 1998: 152).
These long-term outcomes remain to be empirically shown. But for now it appears that
inclusionary zoning requirements imposed on developers do not have a significant effect on
their profitability or on the general housing supply.

Evaluation of Success
There is much consideration that must go into crafting a successful inclusionary zoning
ordinance. But first, the meaning of “successful” in this context must be defined. The most
straightforward way to measure success is to simply look at the number of affordable units
created as a result of implementing an ordinance. At the local level this only entails counting the
number of affordable units integrated into market-rate housing, whether the housing is a new
rental unit, for-sale unit, or the product of the rehabilitation of an existing structure. At the state
or national level, however, totaling the number of affordable units created from inclusionary
housing policies becomes more difficult. One reason is that there is no formalized record of
inclusionary housing beyond the local level, unlike records on total rental or for-sale units
collected by the U.S. Decennial Census, so the units must be tallied up city- by-city. In addition,
inclusionary zoning ordinances differ greatly from one another, so the inclusionary units
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generated in one municipality may not be comparable to those in another. For example, one town
may have twice as many affordable units as another, but they may only be required to stay
affordable for half as long, or may tend to be made available to people with relatively higher
incomes. Furthermore, zoning ordinances are likely to change over time- often the developer
incentives are altered or the ordinance is made mandatory after being voluntary- so all the
inclusionary housing created over a period of time can’t be chalked up to the same policy. These
complications render difficult any comparisons between the outcomes of more than a limited
number of zoning ordinances over time, and so it is impossible to objectively state that one type
of a zoning ordinance is always more effective at creating inclusionary housing than another.
Absolute numbers of affordable units created should also not be compared, but should be
evaluated in regard to the municipality’s and region’s need for affordable housing, as well as the
degree of housing segregation in need of amelioration.
The amount of inclusionary housing created through a specific ordinance must also be
seen in light of broader changes in the housing market. Evidence of the effectiveness of
inclusionary housing policy suggests that more affordable housing is created, and less distortion
occurs in the housing market’s prices and production of housing, when the housing market to
which the ordinance applies is robust and undergoing growth. If less inclusionary housing is
created under one ordinance than another, it may not be necessarily due to any defect of the
ordinance itself, but may rather reflect the presence of a weaker housing market. Differentiating
the effects of housing markets and the implementation of inclusionary zoning in various
municipalities on the creation of affordable housing is a challenge in which much progress has
yet to be made.
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The gross number of inclusionary units- as defined as the number of affordable units
integrated into market-rate housing- may also be an incomplete measure of the effectiveness of
an inclusionary housing policy, since affordable housing may still be created indirectly through
an inclusionary zoning ordinance, even if not integrated into other housing as might be ideal.
Developers are often allowed to contribute in-lieu fees to an affordable housing fund, construct
off-site affordable housing, or make a land donation to a municipality instead of actually
incorporating affordable units into their developments. While this defeats the purpose of
integrating the housing stock and reducing economic segregation, there are also benefits to
allowing developers to make use of these alternatives. Affordable housing is still being created
when off-site units are constructed by private developers, in-lieu fees are used to finance the
construction of affordable housing by non-profit agencies or housing authorities, or donated land
is used for affordable housing when other developable land is scarce. The relevant question is
whether the benefits of these alternatives are equal to or greater than those of integrated housing,
given the circumstances of a municipality’s need for affordable housing. If the in-lieu fees are
inadequate to cover the costs of construction of an equivalent number of affordable units as
would otherwise have been created or if the affordable housing fund from which construction is
financed is mismanaged or used for other expenditures, then the availability of these alternatives
to developers may be counter-productive. If, however, in exchange for not including a certain
percentage of affordable housing in their developments housing developers must build a greater
number of affordable units off-site, contribute more than sufficient in-lieu fees to a housing fund
to cover the cost of constructing the same number of units, or donate land which is valued highly
enough and is to be designated only for the construction of affordable housing, than these
alternatives may in fact have a net positive result.
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Housing developers may opt for alternatives in which they indirectly finance the
construction of more affordable units than they would have had to build themselves if
incorporating affordable units into their developments presents a “unique hardship”- e.g., if
developers are unable to take advantage of incentives which would normally reward the creation
of mixed-income housing, such as density bonuses or relaxed zoning restrictions. How the
attractiveness of these different options to developers and their effectiveness in ultimately
creating affordable housing stack up against each other depends on the design of the inclusionary
zoning ordinance, as well as the relations between developers and the municipality and the
nature of the affordable housing need. In some cases, it may even be desirable for affordable
housing not to be integrated with market-rate housing if the development is too isolated from
employment, public transportation routes, or other social services such that the lower-income
residents become economically stranded in a suburban enclave. Other low-income sociallycohesive groups, such as those pertaining to a specific ethnic minority, may also wish to preserve
their traditional lifestyle rather than become part of an unfamiliar community which is often
intolerant of certain cultural practices, as articulated by affordable housing architect Michael
Pyatok (50). Nevertheless, an inclusionary zoning ordinance can still help finance the creation of
non-integrated affordable housing if the affected residents choose to implement it in such a way.

The nationwide adoption of inclusionary zoning has been modest. Roughly estimated, about
350 to 400 suburban jurisdictions have adopted an inclusionary policy, plus an unknown number
of jurisdictions that practice inclusionary zoning but have no formalized policy (Porter 2004b:
241) About 170 of these jurisdictions are in California alone (NPH 2007: 3). And there are only a
few states in which inclusionary zoning is promoted as a statewide policy. The number of
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jurisdictions that have adopted IZ ordinances may be relatively small compared to the total
number of jurisdictions in the country, especially considering the number of those jurisdictions in
which some policy of inclusionary housing is sorely needed. But the pace at which inclusionary
zoning is expanding gives hope that these numbers will not remain small for long. California, for
example, has recently undergone an extraordinarily rapid expansion of inclusionary zoning
compared to earlier years (NPH 2007: 3). And in all of inclusionary zoning’s history there are
only two instances in which it has been repealed- in Fairfax County, Virginia for legal reasons (it
was later restored), and Prince George’s County, Maryland, in which it was felt to have achieved
its objectives (Brunick 2003b: 9). Furthermore, it should be remembered that inclusionary zoning
ordinances have not been employed as public policy tools for especially long. Given the
relatively recent and previously slow-paced adoption of inclusionary zoning, perhaps these
figures should not be unexpected.
The number of affordable units produced through inclusionary zoning so far has also been
modest. About 65,000 units have been produced in states that mandate towns to make some
provision for affordable housing- about 34,000 of these in California and 29,000 in New
Jersey(Porter 2004b: 239). An additional 15,000 to 25,000 affordable units have been produced
in jurisdictions that adopted a policy of inclusionary zoning by their own volition, and 11,000 of
these were in Montgomery County alone (Porter 2004b: 238). But the need for affordable
housing is significantly greater. In Massachusetts, for example, about 100,000 low-income
families are on waiting lists for affordable housing. From 1990 to 1997, 20,340 subsidized units
were produced in Massachusetts, but only 1,200 of these through inclusionary zoning (Porter
2004b: 242) But again, the relatively recent and limited adoption of inclusionary zoning is partly
to blame for such a lack of success. Some researchers have attempted to estimate how much
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affordable housing could have potentially been created if inclusionary zoning were implemented
earlier in certain places. It is estimated that if inclusionary zoning programs had been in place in
the six county Chicago region from 1974 to 1999, 136,000 inclusionary units could have
conceivably been created (Fischer 2001: 5). Mukhija et al. estimate that if Los Angeles had a
15% set-aside rate from 1980-2001, 28,500 inclusionary units could have been created (qtd. in
Mukhija et al. 2010: 250). And David Rusk estimates that if inclusionary zoning were in place in
the nation’s 100 largest metropolitan areas, 2.6 million inclusionary units could have been
created, twice the number of affordable units created through Low Income Housing Tax Credits
over the same period and enough to meet about 40% of the affordable housing need (Rusk 2005:
2).
However, even the main prospect of inclusionary zoning- integrating housing of various
income levels- has not been realized satisfactorily in many places. An ordinance’s income
targeting provision may favor those of average or moderate income over those of low income,
the eligibility guidelines may be too restrictive, or there may simply be so many loopholes for
developers that any affordable housing which is produced is segregated from the general housing
stock. In New Jersey, for example, intense local resistance to the Mount Laurel court decisions
prompted the passage of a law allowing, among other things, for municipalities to export up to
half of their affordable housing quota to other towns. This only increases segregation by
allowing wealthier suburban towns to buy out of their social burden and instead shift it to those
poorer towns in which affordable housing is already available in excess. The authors of one
analysis of New Jersey inclusionary zoning policy found that it “has not enabled previously
urban residents to move to suburban municipalities and has not enabled Blacks and Latinos to
move from heavily minority areas to the suburbs”(Porter 2004b: 245). Neither has Massachusetts
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inclusionary policy delivered on its promise of greater housing heterogeneity among cities and
suburbs and low and high income groups. After examining the success of the Massachusetts
inclusionary zoning statute 40B in overcoming exclusionary zoning, Krefetz states that the
statute, “has not, for the most part, resulted in any significant ‘opening up’ of the suburbs to
lower income, central city, minority populations” (qtd. in Porter 2004b: 245). Douglas Porter,
however, does see evidence of increased economic integration as a overall result of inclusionary
zoning, even if efforts towards racial integration and the integration of suburban and formerly
urban residents have fallen short of expectations (Porter 2004a: 29). There is also evidence that
newer inclusionary zoning programs are more inclusionary and reach lower income levels than
earlier programs. In California, 47% of inclusionary units created through new programs are
affordable to very low-income households, compared to 20% for older programs (NPH 2007:
20). And 82% of inclusionary units created through newer programs were built on-site,
compared to 47% for older programs (NPH 2007: 21).
The success of inclusionary zoning depends upon its ability to leverage strong housing
markets for the production of affordable housing. The recent dramatic downturn in the national
housing market has devastated many, and does nothing to improve the affordable housing crisis.
It would be unfortunate if inclusionary zoning were temporarily rendered useless by this turn of
events. Luckily, this is not the case. It has been found that inclusionary zoning can actually help
economically sustain developers during recessions and downturns in housing markets. A report
by Business and Professional People for the Public Interest states that “developers sometimes
find that the affordable homes and apartments that they are required to build are a benefit to them
because of the consistently high demand for such units” (Brunick 2003b: 16). Developers in
Montgomery County, Maryland, for example, consider the affordable units developed through its
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inclusionary zoning program to be valuable, because “they always sell-out or rent-up quickly and
help to sustain developers during slower economic times” (Brunick 2003b: 16). Porter
corroborates this account. He asserts that “Montgomery County officials report that when highpriced housing demands sag, many developers evince greater interest in building lower-cost units
to keep their companies engaged in the marketplace” (Porter 2004a: 31). Present conditions are
therefore not unfavorable to inclusionary zoning, but rather exceptionally beneficial to its
expansion. Taking advantage of this opportunity would ensure that inclusionary zoning is in
place when housing markets become productive again, creating better leverage for affordable
housing in the future.

Overall, given the relatively recent implementation of many inclusionary zoning
ordinances, the availability of alternatives to the primary objective of inclusionary zoning, and
widespread developer and political opposition, the directly attributable benefits of inclusionary
zoning have been modest. Both compared to other affordable housing programs and the greater
affordable housing need, inclusionary zoning has been responsible for filling only a small part of
the affordability gap. However, there is much potential for expansion of inclusionary zoning
throughout the country, and even if the absolute amount of affordable housing produced is less
than sufficient, inclusionary zoning can still accomplish the goal of diversifying the nation’s
housing stock in ways other housing programs can’t. Inclusionary zoning is one part of what will
have to be a multipronged approach to addressing the nation’s housing crisis, and progress is still
being made in implementing this tool to its full potential.
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Expanding Inclusionary Zoning to Large Cities:
Challenges and Opportunities
Inclusionary zoning has traditionally been found mostly in the suburbs of metropolitan areas.
However, it is increasingly being applied to central cities, including several of the largest. Since
2000, five major cities with populations over 500,000 people have adopted inclusionary zoning
ordinances (Brunick 2004b: 3). These cities are: Boston, Denver, San Francisco, San Diego and
Sacramento. San Diego is the largest in population out of these and the only city in the country
with both a comprehensive inclusionary zoning program and a population of over one million
people. Although it is disappointing that more major cities have not adopted inclusionary zoning,
this still represents substantial progress, as it is only recently that any large U.S. city has
implemented any inclusionary housing program at all. Furthermore, inclusionary zoning may be
applicable to some cities more than others, depending on the local housing market and the
existing supply and distribution of affordable housing. Some cities, such as Los Angeles, may
also have patchwork inclusionary zoning programs, where mandatory inclusionary requirements
apply only to designated redevelopment areas or development projects built with city financing.
Other cities, like New York City, have inclusionary zoning programs in where incentives (often
density bonuses) are offered for developments built in designated areas which include over a
certain percentage of affordable units. And the city of Chicago negotiates with developers during
rezoning procedures to voluntarily provide affordable housing without having any formal
inclusionary housing program (Porter 2004a: 12).
However, it should definitely not be assumed that just because a city has a greater share of
affordable housing than its suburbs, that affordable and inclusionary housing is not still a
pressing issue. There is a severe lack of affordable housing in many cities which multiple
programs will be needed to remedy. Even in cities with adequate housing, housing costs often
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consume a disproportionate share of poorer residents’ incomes. Perhaps just as important is the
distribution of affordable housing that does exist. Such housing may be located on the
peripheries of cities, away from the greatest concentration of jobs, or may be undesirably
clustered. The social consequences of concentrated and segregated affordable housing are likely
to be exacerbated in the city. Increasingly prevalent housing patterns may also imply a greater
need for inclusionary zoning now than in the past. The trend of greatest concern is gentrification,
where a run-down neighborhood is rehabilitated at the expense of displacing its low and
moderate income former residents. The housing needs of low and moderate income people can’t
be fairly addressed simply by seeking to relocate them to the suburbs; housing should be
available to all segments of a population wherever they choose to live.
The implementation of inclusionary zoning in the five cities mentioned above has been
promising. The cases of Boston, San Diego and Denver are worth examining more closely.
Boston’s current inclusionary housing program was initiated by the executive order of Mayor
Thomas Menino in 2000 when it became clear that its existing inclusionary housing program was
failing to meet its goals. Soaring housing prices were displacing moderate income residents
downtown and in surrounding neighborhoods while high-profile housing developments were
being built without any affordable units (Brunick 2004b: 3). To address this, the current
inclusionary housing program requires a 10% affordable unit set-aside rate for all housing
developments with ten or more units which are financed or developed on land owned by the City
of Boston or the Boston Redevelopment Authority, or which require some form of zoning relief
(Brunick 2004b: 3). This effectively amounts to all housing developments of this size. In-lieu
fees are allowed, as are off-site units, but the set-aside rate must be 15%. As of 2004, over 200
affordable units had been created as a direct result of the program, with more units in
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development and $4 million collected in fees (Brunick 2004b: 3). The high ratio of fees collected
to affordable units built is not unintentional. Affordable housing advocates were more concerned
about the quantity rather than the distribution of affordable units, and therefore lobbied for the
inclusion of in-lieu fees and off-site units as attractive alternatives to making the units truly
inclusionary (Brunick 2003a: 5). The ordinance is reported to be an overall success, with housing
development unaffected and the city now considering raising its overall set-aside rate to 15%.
Denver’s inclusionary zoning ordinance was passed by the city council in 2002, and unlike
most inclusionary housing programs, covers not only new construction but rehabilitation of
existing housing, as well (Brunick 2004b: 3). Denver is also exceptional in terms of the quantity
of affordable units produced: 3,395 between 2002 and 2004 (Brunick 2004b: 4). The incometargeting of this ordinance is also fairly deep, requiring that inclusionary rental units be
affordable to those earning 65% AMI and for-sale units be affordable to those earning 80% AMI.
(Inclusionary rental units can only be provided voluntarily, however, due to a prohibition on rent
control.) Perhaps the success of Denver’s program can be attributed to the generosity of
incentives. The program, not uncommonly, allows for in-lieu fees, off-site units, and flexible
parking standards and provides for density bonuses and fast-track permitting. But surprisingly,
the program also offers cash subsidies of $5,000 for every unit affordable to households below
80% AMI, and $10,000 for every unit affordable to households below 60% AMI (Brunick
2004b: 4; Porter 2004b 228). Moreover, it has had no noticeable negative effect on city
development (Brunick 2004b: 4). Yet despite the inclusionary program’s apparent favorability to
developers, enforcement of its standards is strict. A survey of large cities with inclusionary
zoning reports that, “If the developer violates the ordinance in any way, including not
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constructing the required affordable units, the city may deny, suspend, or revoke any and all
building and occupancy permits”(Brunick 2003a: 7).
San Diego’s inclusionary housing program has been in place since 2003, and represents the
expansion of an earlier inclusionary housing program which was only limited to a certain
developing area in the city. The program is not especially unique, except that housing developers
are offered no incentives or cost offsets whatsoever, an economic analysis having shown them to
be unnecessary for developers to still be profitable under the new requirements. And developers,
after strongly opposing the ordinance at first, eventually ended up supporting it after working
with the city’s Housing Commission to draft some of its provisions (Brunick 2003a: 9).
These case studies demonstrate how inclusionary zoning programs can be crafted to suit a variety
of needs in large, central cities. Boston, Denver, and San Diego all tailored their programs in
unique ways. Boston’s program is applicable to most new development, places a stronger
emphasis on the quantity rather than dispersal of affordable units, and offers little in the way of
incentives except for density bonuses in select instances. Denver’s program applies to all types
of housing creation and has a strong emphasis on developer incentives and making the
inclusionary units as affordable as possible, but exercises strict enforcement of the program
guidelines. And San Diego offers no development incentives at all, but nonetheless is unopposed
by developers owing to the positive implementation of a previous inclusionary program at a
smaller scale and by including developers in the political process of its adoption. This kind of
adaptability is essential to making inclusionary zoning in cities as successful as possible,
especially considering the unique challenges cities face in this regard. As Douglas Porter writes,
“City inclusionary programs raise two issues that have not been fully explored in the literature or
by experience in suburban jurisdictions. One is the question of how to stimulate creation of new
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units when developable land is scarce; the other is how to promote production of new units
without undue displacement of existing residents” (Porter 2004a: 31). In regard to a lack of
developable land, some cities may face this issue less than others. Denver, for example, has an
extensive supply of developable land downtown and other cities may have tracts of land which
are abandoned or underdeveloped (Porter 2004a: 31). For other cities, however, a large fraction
of housing development is rehabilitation of existing housing- which raises the issue of
displacement of existing residents- or the construction of high-rent apartment buildings in places
where land is at a premium. Rehabilitation of old or run-down housing can benefit some, but can
also displace low-income residents who can only occupy the most affordable housing available.
Applying inclusionary zoning to rehabilitated units may seem like the intuitive answer, but
rehabilitation poses special obstacles that the construction of new housing does not. For one,
often less units are rehabilitated and at a slower pace than would be the case if the units were part
of a new development, meaning that rehabilitation projects may not meet the typical threshold
for inclusionary zoning to apply. Also, rehabilitation projects don’t enjoy the same economies of
scale in production as new development projects, meaning increased costs per unit for the
developer (Porter 2004b: 229). Consequently, as Porter writes, “It appears that only a few of the
[inclusionary] ordinances require affordable units in rehabilitation of existing housing or allow
credit toward new unit requirements for rehabilitating units or converting nonresidential units”
(Porter 2004a: 13).
Inclusionary zoning also must adapt to the unique challenge posed by cities in which a large
portion of new housing development is the construction of high-rent, high-rise apartment
buildings. As with rehabilitation projects, high-rise developments carry higher costs per unit, and
so mandating the inclusion of affordable units is likely to be more strongly opposed by
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developers. It is also more difficult to offer incentives to mitigate these costs since density
bonuses- the most frequently used incentives- wouldn’t be very beneficial to a development
which is already planned to have as much density or nearly as much density as possible. High
rise developments are also composed of rental units, posing the additional problem of rent
control. Some cities, such as Denver, prohibit government interference in setting rent levels, so if
any units are set at below-market rents for a certain duration of time, it must be done so
voluntarily. This issue arose recently in Los Angeles, when a newly passed inclusionary zoning
ordinance applying only to redevelopment areas was challenged in court by a developer who
claimed that the price restrictions on rental units contradicted an earlier law banning any form of
rent control. Although this should not have invalidated the entire ordinance, many California
cities and towns now must reevaluate the legality of their ordinances to ensure that their
programs are not similarly threatened by developer litigation.
Another potential legal issue is passing the same “specifically attributable” and
“proportionality” tests that development exactions must pass in the suburbs. As Thomas Kleven
writes in “Inclusionary Zoning Moves Downtown”, “At least one court which has been willing to
accept exactions on new development in growing communities has suggested that it might be a
different matter in fully developed communities. The court apparently felt the threats of lack of
causal attribution and disproportionality to be greater in the urban context” (Merriam 1985: 117).
He argues that it may be harder to demonstrate a need for low-cost housing if no net population
growth is occurring and redevelopment is perceived solely as a positive economic activity. He
also cautions that it might seem disproportionate to place the costs of affordable housing only on
new development and redevelopment and not existing development, as well. The economic and
legal issues surrounding new development and redevelopment in cities should be taken seriously,
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since jeopardizing possible economic activity in a struggling city may be the least desirable
outcome of all. But Kleven replies that a city should still be able to make a legitimate case for
inclusionary zoning “where it can show that redevelopment, either on an individual project basis
or as an overall process, displaces low-income people, or reduces the low-cost housing stock, or
increases housing prices by stimulating gentrification” (qtd. in Merriam 1985: 123-124).
Implementing inclusionary zoning in cities presents unique challenges, but also presents
unique opportunities. One such opportunity is the possibility of reducing urban sprawl. A lack of
affordable housing in central cities compels low and moderate income people to move to the
suburbs, if more affordable housing is to be found there. Douglas Porter documents the
clustering of inclusionary housing programs around certain metropolitan areas. For example,
Washington DC, which has been slow to implement inclusionary zoning, is surrounded by
Montgomery, Howard, and Frederick Counties in Maryland and Fairfax, Arlington, and Loudoun
Counties in Northern Virginia, all of which have active inclusionary zoning programs (Porter
2004a: 21). Similar clusters also exist around San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, Denver
and Boston (Porter 2004a: 21). If housing opportunities can be found around central cities but
not in the cities themselves, this may exacerbate trends of urban sprawl. Indeed, while higherincome households relocate back to urban centers, evidence suggests that low and moderateincome households are simultaneously relocating to inner-ring suburbs. For example, an article
in the journal of the American Planning Association reports that, “Census data for 2003 show
that cities such as Chicago, which saw population gains from 1990 to 2000, have again begun
losing population to suburbs with better housing options for working-class households” (Brunick
2004b: 6). This does not necessarily mean that there is no affordable housing crisis in the
suburbs- only that in some cases rents and housing prices are marginally better than what can be
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found in the city. This also says nothing about the distribution of affordable housing. Ideally, a
city and its suburbs should both have a balanced amount of affordable housing which
accommodates the mix of income levels of those that choose to work and reside in either place.
The location of affordable housing should not distort the decisions people make as to where to
live, nor should its residents have to commute farther to their workplaces for lack of closer
housing of equal quality. Inclusionary zoning should be implemented in cities experiencing
sprawl as urban residents are priced out of their homes, just as inclusionary zoning should be
implemented in suburbs where low and moderate income earners are unable to live in the very
towns in which they work. As stated in the report “Large Cities and Inclusionary Zoning”,
“Through an inclusionary zoning program, large cities can use density bonuses and other cost
offsets to produce a stock of affordable housing within the city core, thereby helping to reduce
the pressure to continually sprawl outward in order to produce affordable housing on the fringe”
(Brunick 2004b: 2). As another unique advantage of inclusionary zoning in cities, these cost
offsets would not even have to be substantial. As the same report goes on to state, city staff
interviewed in the cities of Denver, Boston, San Francisco, San Diego, and Sacramento indicate
that, “cost offsets were not necessary because the strength of the local housing market and the
ongoing demand from people to live and build housing in those cities allowed developers to
build the “set-aside” units and still make their project work economically” (Brunick 2004b: 3). In
support of this point, Porter argues that to apply inclusionary zoning to especially cost-intensive
developments in large cities, cost offsets wouldn’t have to be as large as previously assumed. For
example, “inclusionary zoning requirements can work in high-rise building if developers view
inclusionary projects as a whole rather than insist on analyzing comparative costs of market-rate
units…Affordable units can be downsized and equipped less lavishly than market-rate units. The
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building can be designed to group them efficiently in sections of floors. A modest density
(building height) increase can be offered to provide added space for them”, etc. (Porter 2004a:
34). Urban environments are often conducive to discovering innovative design solutions, and it
would be in the interest of many cities to find ways to make inclusionary zoning work rather than
assuming that no more can or should be done to address the affordable housing issue. As Paul
Davidoff, one of the original proponents of inclusionary zoning wrote, “Too often, the
revitalization of city neighborhoods fails to benefit existing residents and frequently leads to
their displacement…Rather than including them by offering decent education, employment, and
housing, the poor have been treated as an obstacle to revitalization. It is only when we begin to
act inclusionarily that our cities will have a chance to grow decently and equitably” (Merriam
1985: 4-5).
One final advantage of adopting inclusionary zoning in cities lies in the fact that cities can
serve as visible pioneers of policy. If large cities across the county demonstrate successful
implementation of inclusionary zoning, it could result in smaller cities and towns following their
lead, fueling a faster proliferation of inclusionary zoning than if isolated suburbs adopt it
independently, as is being done now. As David Rusk notes, “Neighbors do follow the leader”. As
evidence, he cites the fact that 34 municipalities were the first in their counties to adopt
inclusionary zoning. These municipalities averaged 17 percent of their county’s population when
inclusionary zoning was first adopted, but surrounding towns subsequently followed suit, such
that such that 52 percent of those counties’ populations are now subject to inclusionary zoning,
as well (Rusk 2005: 5). An analysis of the effects of inclusionary zoning on the housing markets
of San Francisco, Washington D.C., and suburban Boston also revealed that, “The probability of
having IZ increases with the share of other jurisdictions in the county who have IZ, even
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controlling for other characteristics”(Been 2007: 76). Strategic adoption of inclusionary zoning
in metropolitan areas could have an enormous influence on the spread of inclusionary zoning to
the rest of the country.

Insider Policy Recommendations
The theory behind inclusionary zoning is abundant, but actually designing, passing and
successfully implementing an inclusionary ordinance can be challenging. It may be especially
difficult contending with the intangibles of the process, such as collaborating with developers
and garnering public support. Some lessons in navigating such policy can only be gained through
experience, and it is with this in mind that renowned housing expert and former mayor of
Albuquerque, David Rusk, offers his recommendations for anyone seeking to create inclusionary
zoning. In his keynote address to the National Inclusionary Housing Conference of 2005, Rusk
recommends enacting a mandatory inclusionary zoning law, claiming that voluntary programs
“simply give spineless public officials political cover” (2005: 3). He also advocates fairness to
developers, stating that they should not suffer an economic loss because of inclusionary zoning
(4). In regard to getting an IZ ordinance passed, Rusk recommends stressing the importance of
workforce housing needs, countering misinformation- particularly about its effects on housing
prices, and forming broad-based coalitions to provide the necessary political will for effective
implementation. And once an ordinance is adopted, Rusk recommends using public subsidies to
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achieve deeper affordability, as is done in Montgomery County, since “even with all the costoffsets, most builders cannot bring production costs below what families as 50-60% AMI can
afford” (4).
This is one perspective on how to further inclusionary zoning, but others may take a less
progressive tack. Rusk’s recommendations are also short on specifics as to what positions to take
in negotiations with developers. To satisfy this need the Non-Profit Housing Association of
Northern California (NPH) and the Home Builders Association of Northern California (HBANC)
prepared a joint policy statement on how best to create inclusionary housing. Although these two
organizations differed on the merits of inclusionary zoning, these were a number of positions on
which they agreed. In regard to alternatives to on-site construction, it was agreed that housing
developers should have the option of paying in-lieu fees, dedicating land, constructing units offsite, or using credit transfers. More specifically, any developers with projects of less than 50
units should be able to pay in-lieu fees without demonstrating their necessity; any dedicated land
or off-site construction should accommodate more affordable units or for lower-income
households than the original planned development and should be in the same jurisdiction; and
two developers should be able to satisfy their inclusionary requirements through a mutual
project, and any additional affordable units should be eligible for use as credits either for future
inclusionary requirements or for other developers to purchase (NPH 2005: 3-6). It was also
agreed that municipalities should make substantial contributions of their own with respect to
incentives, cost offsets, and program administration. Municipalities were advised to provide
housing assistance bonds, relieve developers of impact and processing fees, make density
bonuses standard, and offer any surplus publicly-owned land to developers of affordable
housing(6). Local governments were additionally advised to provide a dedicated staff to
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administer the program “or contract with a competent entity to do so”, and to take responsibility
for any unsold for-sale inclusionary units by either purchasing and marketing them or allowing
them to be sold at the market rate and capturing the difference in sales prices to take
responsibility for any unsold for-sale inclusionary units by either purchasing and marketing them
as affordable units or allowing them to be sold at the market rate and capturing the difference in
sales prices(7). This is a perspective which perhaps gives more leeway to developers than many
inclusionary zoning advocates might be comfortable with. But addressing developer concerns
encourages fairness and creates a better development atmosphere for all.
Douglas Porter reaffirms many of the policy recommendations above, and stresses a few
points of his own. He emphasizes building community support for inclusionary zoning, both
before and after its adoption. Porter suggests appealing to the positive economic effect of
adequate workforce housing and tracking the experience of similar communities with
inclusionary zoning (without simply copying from their ordinances) (2004a: 35). He also
suggests experimenting with a planned inclusionary zoning program first by educating the public
about its potential benefits, then negotiating agreements with developers of large or prominent
projects, and finally transforming those voluntary arrangements into a mandatory program after
years of trial and error (35). Porter also reiterates the importance of strong administrative
support, supplementary housing programs, and State incentives or sanctions that promote
inclusionary zoning (36).
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Conclusions
The literature on inclusionary zoning is replete with recommendations and cautionary
tales, often from people with direct experience with the policy. To this literature I can only hope
to make a humble contribution of my own. Although there are many concerns with the
implementation of inclusionary zoning which are commonly addressed, there are a few which I
believe deserve greater attention, or which I expect to become larger issues in the years ahead.
One concern I have is with the setting of in-lieu fees. In many ordinances it appears that these
fees are calculated arbitrarily, or if there is a formula, it’s not explicitly justified as to why the
formula provides for optimal affordable housing creation. More than one commentator has
identified in-lieu fees as a potential weak-link in many inclusionary zoning programs, so these
fees should be determined carefully, as should all incentives and cost offsets. Another
concerning issue is the inadequate coverage of certain development types in many IZ ordinances.
One problem, as already mentioned, is the applicability of inclusionary requirements only to new
developments and not rehabilitation projects, or only to developments which are below a certain
height or density. These loopholes pertain especially to cites, and will therefore become
increasingly relevant. A related problem is applying inclusionary requirements only to
developments above a certain size threshold. Although this may be appropriate to many
municipalities, as developable land becomes more scarce these requirements should be updated
so as not to exclude a large portion of new developments. Finally, it should again be noted that in
the wake of the housing market collapse, inclusionary zoning has not been rendered temporarily
ineffectual, but rather holds unique potential to sustain housing developers.
Inclusionary zoning is not a panacea to the affordable housing crisis. A number of
solutions will be required to make housing more economically integrated and accessible, and
inclusionary zoning has its pros and cons just as every other affordable housing policy does. But
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a well-implemented IZ program has the potential to do much good for a community, and local
policymakers should be aware of this. A future to look forward to would be one where
inclusionary zoning is commonplace, not just as a set of requirements to be imposed on others,
but as a mutual commitment between the private market, governments and citizens to provide for
the needs of all.
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Appendix: Inclusionary Zoning Ordinance of Boulder, Colorado
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